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Summary 
 
The paper discusses TRIPS as a protection measure on knowledge and new technologies 
through property rights and analyses the Southern concern if protection of new 
technologies by means of TRIPS may mean that South can no longer imitate the North in 
implementing emerging technologies and concepts as was the case with Newly 
Industrialized Countries of Asia in 1980s. The paper shows that trade and research and 
development trends are highly skewed in favor of the North and this means that in any 
such international economic landscape, TRIPS may advantage the North and restrict the 
South from trading under a technologically aligned level playing field. 
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1. Introduction:  
 
International trade is like a game in which gains are related to the extent to which one 
plays the game. When the rules of the game improve or referees become more powerful, 
the main players gain more and those who play occasionally gain much less. It is 
therefore in the nature of things that big traders will gain more not only in absolute terms 
but also in proportionate terms in relation to small traders. 
 
The traditional theory of comparative advantage in international trade based on factors of 
production (land, labour, capital and organization) has been revised from a static game to 
a dynamic one. Export success and dominance of international markets depends not so 
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much on static advantage embodied in natural resources or derived from low labour costs 
as on the dynamic capacity of a country to adapt, initiate and imbibe new technology. 
Information is becoming a key element in production process as raw materials and labour 
costs are declining as a proportion of production costs. Countries can now be divided into 
technologically rich and technologically poor or leaders in technology and followers. The 
leaders in the field are tempted to restrict diffusion as it enhances market value of their 
lead and protects their monopolistic position. In the dynamic sense the international trade 
scenario may then be loaded against developing countries. 
 
As shown in figure 1, in recent times the main beneficiaries of trade have been the OECD 
countries where also coincidently the head quarters of the administrators of international 
trade exists.  Now with the increasing dynamics of services sector, trade in goods has 
been linked to the trade in services. As TNCs currently provide the underpinning of the 
global economy, this linkage will clear the decks for expansion with long protection of 
patents and freedom to invest anywhere around the globe. Trade in Services, TRIPs and 
TRIMs has become subject to International Conduct Rules and its supervision has been 
internationalized. There is a broadening in the scope of property rights for new ideas, thus 
extension in the period of protection and the strengthening of the enforcement 
mechanism. 
  
  Figure 1 
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In India, Brazil and other leading developing countries one of the major basic objection in 
subsequent WTO talks has been on its provisions pertaining to intellectual property. It is 
alleged that whereas the Capitalist System swears by competition, the credo of 
intellectual property rights tends to foster monopolies; it restricts competition, restrains 
production and thereby tend to contract overall trade. This is contrary to the objectives of 
GATT, which is to expand trade. There is much truth in the assertion as the developing 
countries have failed to get a commitment to freer transfer of technology as quid pro quo 
for the protection of intellectual property rights. The agreement on intellectual property 
rights is likely to be used against the developing countries as how in many developing 
countries see the emphasis upon initiatives like TRIPS. Such concerns are also pointed 
out by many prominent economists in the West, where the likes of Stiglitz (2006) have 
become vocal skeptics of TRIPS and its implementation. For example, technology 
advancement in developing countries will be retarded by 20 years patent protection and 
50 years for copyright. The compulsory enforcement of new patents and copyrights seems 
to be designed in favor of rich OECD countries. 
 
The major objective of the paper is to understand the concept of trade related Intellectual 
Property Rights and their importance in the present scenario of the patterns in 
international trade especially between North and South. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section gives detailed theoretical definition of 
TRIPS. The main provisions of the agreement are also discussed there. Section 3 tries to 
capture the factors which give economic motivation for the agreement to be implemented 
in the first place. It revives Bhagwati’s concept of “Big Giant Syndrome1” by implying 
that Northern economies may end up following a policy of protectionism by introducing 
                                                           
1 Bhagwati (1988) introduced this concept in his book Protectionism by stating that England in late 
nineteenth century was suffering from Big Giant Syndrome because it became the advocate of protectionism 
after its exports were hampered. 
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the concept of intellectual property rights on to the world as otherwise there is a 
possibility for Northern comparative advantage to be worn out with the passage of time. 
The asymmetries existing in North and South are also stated to be the reason for a 
negative outcome of TRIPS for developing countries in this section. Some empirical 
evidence in this respect is also being reviewed. Finally, concluding remarks comprises 
section 4. 
                              
2: Definition and Nature of TRIPs 
 
2.1. An Overview: 
 
The Uruguay round introduced, for the first time in the history of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tarrifs (GATT), multilateral negotiations on “trade related intellectual 
property rights”. Under strong pressure by the industrialized countries, a specific 
agreement on the availability and enforcement of such rights became the part of the final 
act of the round: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(hereinafter called “TRIPS Agreement”). The TRIPS Agreement is the most 
comprehensive international instrument on intellectual property rights (IPRs), deals with 
all types of IPRs. The agreement claims that widely varying standards in the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights and the lack of a multilateral framework of 
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods have 
been a growing source of tension in international economic relations. Rules and 
disciplines were needed to cope with these tensions. To that end, the agreement addresses 
the applicability of basic GATT principles and those of relevant international intellectual  
property agreements; the provision of adequate intellectual property rights; the provision 
of effective enforcement measures for those rights; multilateral dispute settlement ; and 
transitional arrangements. 
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 2.1.1. The Agreement: 
The Agreement establishes minimum standards on: 
1.  copy right and related rights, including computer programmes and databases 
2.  trade marks 
3.  geographical indications 
4.  industrial designs 
5.  patents 
6.  integrated circuits, and 
7.  undisclosed information (trade secrets) 
 
the standards of protection set forth relate both to the availability of rights as well as to 
their enforcement. 
 
This means member countries can not, in specific areas and issues covered by the 
Agreement, confer a lower level of protection than provided under the agreement. At the 
same time, members can not be obliged to provide “more extensive” protection (Article 
1.1). Provisions of enforcement are more detailed in the TRIPS agreement than the 
preexisting conventions on IPRs. TRIPS also allow a country to apply cross retaliation 
measures like quotas on exports of such a country which is found to be guilty of 
noncompliance with the minimum standards. 
 
2.1.2. Main Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
Part I of the agreement sets out general provisions and basic principles, notably a 
national-treatment commitment under which the nationals of other parties must be given 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to a party’s own nationals with regard to 
the protection of intellectual property. It also contains a most favored nation clause, a 
novelty in an international intellectual property agreement, under which any advantage a 
party gives to the nationals of another must be extended immediately and unconditionally 
to the nationals of all other parties, even if such treatment is more favourable than that 
which it gives to its own nationals. 
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Part II addresses each intellectual property right in succession. With respect to copy right, 
parties are required to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention 
for the protection of literary and artistic works. Industrial designs are protected for a 
period of 10 years. Owners of protected designs would be able to manufacture, sale and 
importation of articles bearing or embodying a design which is the copy of the protected 
design. 
 
As regards patents, there is a general obligation to comply with the substantive provisions 
of the Paris Convention (1967). In addition, the agreement requires that 20 year patent 
protection be available for all inventions, whether of products or processes, in almost all 
fields of technology. Inventions may be excluded from patentability if their commercial 
exploitation is prohibited for reasons of public order or morality; otherwise, the permitted 
exclusions are for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, and for plants and (other 
than micro organism) animals and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals( other than microbiological processes).  
 
2.1.3. Restrictive practices in licensing agreements 
 
The TRIPS Agreement allows member countries to control and ban restrictive practices 
provided for in licensing agreements that in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights with an adverse effect on competition. The Agreement thus 
introduces the ‘competition test’ for the purpose of verifying and curbing the use of 
restrictive clauses, as proposed by industrialized countries during the long and 
unsuccessful negotiations under UNCTAD auspices on an international code of conduct 
for the transfer of technology. 
 
2.1.4. Enforcement 
The Agreement also contains detailed provisions regarding judicial and administrative 
procedures and other measures related to the enforcement of rights, as well as specific 
rules for preventing trade in goods bearing false trademarks and in pirated works which 
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infringe copyrights. The enforcement part of the Agreement constitutes a major 
innovation as compared to previous international conventions on the matter, which dealt 
exclusively or mainly with the availability of rights and not with procedures for 
exercising them. 
 
2.1.5. Dispute settlement 
 
The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement as such cannot be the direct and sole basis of a 
claim by a private party, that is, it has not been conceived as a self-executing instrument. 
An action which charges non compliance with the rules of the TRIPS agreement can only 
be taken by other WTO members and not by individuals or firms. Non-compliance with 
the new rules, once adopted, would give rise to a dispute settlement procedure under the 
WTO rules and, possibly, to retaliatory commercial measures in any field (not only in 
IPRs) by the country whose nationals are affected by such non-compliance. Since, within 
the WTO, adherence to the new IPRs universal standards will be monitored by the 
Council for TRIPS, the possibility of deviations from those standards is drastically 
reduced, unless a non-complying country is prepared to bear the costs of any trade 
restrictions that may be imposed. The new WTO "Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" provides a limited time frame and 
considerable automaticity for the settlement of disputes. It creates a Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) composed of all WTO members and stipulates a ‘negative consensus’ rule 
for the establishment of panels,the adoption of their reports and the authorization of 
retaliatory measures. Such a rule means that the panel process will be instituted if at least 
one country favors this course. 
 
The adoption of this Understanding also means that unilateral actions, such as action 
under section 301 of the US Trade Act, cannot be imposed before the DSB has verified 
the existence of a case of non-compliance and authorized retaliatory action. Any 
unilateral action taken before or outside such a procedure would be illegal under the 
WTO agreement. 
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2.1.6. Transitional provisions: 
 
 Finally, the Agreement contains provisions that allow developing countries to delay 
complying with any or all of the Agreement's obligations for up to five years from the 
date of entry into force of the Agreement. An additional five years is allowed in the case 
of countries which did not grant product patents before entry into force of the Agreement 
but which now have to do so under the terms of the Agreement. The least-developed 
countries may delay implementation for up to 11 years. This term may be extended by the 
Council for TRIPS upon request setting out the reasons. 
 
2.1.7. Technical co-operation: 
 
Developed countries members of WTO are obliged, under Article 67 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, to provide "technical and financial co-operation" in favor of developing and 
least developed countries to facilitate the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Such 
co-operation, which is to be provided upon request and on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions, includes assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations, support for 
domestic offices and in the prevention of abuse of IPRs. This obligation on the part of 
developed countries, if not adequately fulfilled, may be the subject matter of a claim 
before the Council for TRIPS, as in the case of any other obligation defined by the 
Agreement. 
 
2.1.8 Review of the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO: 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is to be reviewed for the first time five years from the date of its 
entry into force, and at two-yearly intervals. There after (Article 71). The Council for 
TRIPS may also undertake reviews when new developments warrant modifications. 
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3.   Is TRIPS really a Big Giant Syndrome? 
 
Industrialized countries have lobbied to initiate negotiation of an agreement on TRIPS 
with the clear objective of universalizing the standards of IPRs protection that the former 
had incorporated in their legislation, once they had attained a high level of technological 
and industrial capability. The evolution of IPRs standards, following changes in the 
relative strength of different industries, has been tangible in the patent field, as illustrated 
by the late introduction of pharmaceutical product patents by France, Switzerland, Japan, 
Spain and other developed countries. Developing countries reluctantly accepted increased 
standards of protection for IPRs in GATT by making reforms of their intellectual property 
legislation without obtaining any major concessions from industrialized countries.    
 
A number of factors that converged during the last decade or so explain the priority given 
by some countries especially the US, to a far reaching reform of the intellectual property 
system world wide. 
 
Firstly, technology became a factor of growing importance in international competition, 
particularly for the production of technology intensive goods and services, which account 
for the most dynamic segments of international trade. This trend was reflected in the 
steady increase of research and development (R&D) expenditures in industrialized 
countries since the 1970s, with growing participation of the private sector in total R&D. 
In many of these countries, half or more of R&D expenditures are funded by the private 
sector, particularly by big companies in science-intensive sectors.  
 
Secondly, high externalities in the production of knowledge associated with new 
technologies limited the appropriability of R&D results and prompted reforms in the IPRs 
regimes in order to create or reinforce exclusive rights. The US pioneered the extension 
of IPRs protection in the field of new technologies. Based on their domestic 
developments, US firms and government actively pursued the internationalization of the 
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new standards of protection via unilateral action and initiatives in various multilateral 
fora, including the World Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO) and GATT. 
This process was clearly shown with regard to computer programmes, semi conductors 
and biotechnology. 
Thirdly, the elimination or reduction of trade barriers in developing countries increased 
the opportunities for direct exports for those countries. It also led to increased pressure by 
multinational enterprises to get unrestricted access to those markets and to be freed from 
the obligation to exploit patented inventions locally or to transfer technology to local 
firms. 
 
Fourthly, during the 1980s US supremacy in manufacturing and technology had been 
eroded by catching-up process in Japan, first, and in Asian newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) later. These countries emerged as aggressive competitors in consumer electronics, 
microelectronics, robotics, computers and peripherals, as well as in various services (e.g., 
engineering and construction). The erosion of the technological leadership of US firms in 
certain high-tech areas, coupled with high US trade deficit, was particularly attributed to 
too-open technological and scientific system which allowed foreign countries to imitate 
and profit from US innovations. Thus, a major source of declining American 
competitiveness was conceived to be the losses from overseas piracy and counterfeiting 
activities. This perception was effectively promoted by industrial lobbies ( particularly the 
pharmaceutical, software and phonogram industries), which convinced the US 
government about the need to link trade and IPRs in order to increase the returns on R&D 
and to prevent imitation. The monopoly rights granted by IPRs have also been regarded as 
an instrument to avoid further catching-up based on imitative paths of industrialization, 
that is, as a tool to freeze the comparative advantages that had so far ensured US 
technological supremacy. 
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3.1. The North-South Asymmetries: 
 
The new emerging framework on IPRs basically universalizes standards of protection that 
are suitable for industrialized countries or, more precisely, for certain industrial sectors in 
which firms based in such countries dominate. Though the TRIPS agreement leaves a 
certain room for maneuver at the national level, it restricts the options available and 
ignores the profound differences in economic and technological capabilities between the 
North and the South. The developing countries only account for about 6% of world R&D 
expenditures in 1980s as can be seen in table 1 and the trends are still declining for most 
developing countries. Developing countries are, hence, overwhelmingly dependent upon 
innovations made in North. 
                                 
                 Table 1:   
                           Distribution of world R&D (%) 
Region % world R&D 
Africa 
Latin Ameriaca 
Asia, including Middle East and China 
 
NICs and LDCs 
Former USSR and Eastern Europe 
OECD 
 
     0.4 
     1.5 
    4.1 
 
     6.0 
    20.0 
    74.0 
 
This dependence is also reflected in patent statistics. Thus, 95% of 1,650,800 patents 
granted in the United States between 1977 and 1996 were conferred on applicants from 
10 industrialized countries. In that period, developing countries accounted for less than 
2%. The share of developing countries in the trade of medium and high tech goods also 
indicates that industrialized countries will benefit the most from the new rules on IPRs. 
Of the exports of the Group of 8 (G8) leading industrial countries to OECD (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, 56.7% consist of medium and 
high technology goods, a proportion similar to that of the Asian “Tigers” (53.3%). The 
degree of Latin American specialization in those goods is significantly lower (26.5%). 
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But Asian Tigers and Latin American countries together only account for about 11% of 
total exports of such goods to OECD countries, against 50.6% for G 8 countries (Alcorta 
and Peres, 1995). 
 
3.2. Protection by means of TRIPS 
 
In this section, dynamic trade models of intra industry trade between North and South are 
being discussed to capture the distortion effects of TRIPS; which is more of a concept of 
intra industry trade.     
 
Krugman (1990) developed some dynamic models to show the possible outcomes of the 
trade between two countries. Here we try to show how TRIPS can fit in these models. 
There are two basic assumptions of these models. First, markets are both oligopolistic and 
segmented: firms are aware those there actions affect the price they receive and are able 
to charge different prices in different markets. The second assumption is that there is 
some kind of economies of scale e.g. a declining marginal cost curve or dynamic scale 
economies of learning curve. The basic model was started by assuming two firms: home 
and foreign. Each firm produces a single product, which it sells in a number of markets in 
competition with the other firm. The firms’ products may but need not be the perfect 
substitutes. The segmented markets in which they compete may be divided by transport 
costs, border taxes, or type of purchaser; they may include markets in each firm’s home 
country and also markets in third countries. Thus in market i (i=1,…n) the revenue 
funtiom of the home firm is ),( *
iiii
xxRR = where *,
ii
xx are deliveries to the ith market by 
the home and foreign firms, respectively. Similarly, the foreign firm’s revenue function 
is ),( *
*
iiii
xxRR =  
 
He assumed that each firm’s marginal revenue is the decreasing in other firm’s output. 
On the other side, each firm will face both production costs and transport costs: thus total 
costs for each firm will be 
)(
iii
xCxtTC ∑∑ +=  
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****
ii
i
xCxtTC ∑∑ +=  
where as MCs of production are also declining. By using multimarket Cournot model, 
Krugman estimated marginal costs *,µµ . The figure 1 shows the competition in the 
representative market for given estimates of marginal costs. The curves FF and F*F* are 
the reaction function of the domestic and foreign firm, respectively. 
                                                F 
                                               F* 
 
                                       
*
i
x  
     
                                                                                          F                                F*      
                                                                                            
i
x  
 If µ , the home firms marginal cost is reduced, the FF will be pushed out as shown in the 
figure. Xi will rise and Xi* will fall. This will happen in each market in which the firms 
compete, so that total output of the firm will rise and total output of the foreign firm will 
fall. This will lead to a further increase (decrease) in the marginal costs of the foreign 
(domestic) firms. This shows that domestic marginal cost is the decreasing function of 
foreign marginal cost, and vice versa. Krugman showed this in the form of a figure. 
 
                                            U* 
 
 
 
                                                                                          U(U*)                  U*(U) 
 
                   
                                                                                          U 
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CASE 1: Protection 
 Suppose that the home government excludes the foreign firm from some market 
previously open to it. This market might be the whole domestic market or some piece.  
To find the effects of this, we first hold U constant. The effect under this is solely to raise 
Xi and lower Xi* in the newly protected market. This in turn however, affects marginal 
costs. Thus for a given level of foreign marginal cost, domestic cost falls: for a given 
level of domestic marginal cost, foreign cost rises. The curve U(U*) shifts left, U*(U) 
shifts right. The result is a fall in U and rise in U*. 
                             
 
 
                 U*      
 
 
                                                                            U(U*)       U*(U) 
 
                                                                          U 
 
 
 
Now the change in MCs cause FF to shift out, F*F* to shift in; Xj rises, Xj falls.  
  
                                                 F 
 
 
                             Xj*              F* 
         
 
                                                                                F                                             F* 
                                                                                            Xj 
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Protecting the domestic firm in one market increases domestic sales and lowers foreign 
sales in all markets. Thus by protecting one market the government gives the domestic 
firm greater economies of scale while reducing those of its foreign competitors.  
If we consider foreign firm as NORTH and domestic firm as SOUTH, then the 
implications are that the South can easily out class North by protecting its industrial 
sector as it did in the case of Asian miracle where North loses out its market share in 
automobiles and light manufactures.  The heart of the story is decreasing costs.  
 
CASE 2 : Competition in R&D: 
 
Krugman also introduced model comprising dynamic economies of scale involved in 
Research and Development. The model is similar to the one discussed above. There are 
again two firms, competing in number of markets; demand looks the same as in model I. 
Costs, however, look some what different. Marginal production cost is independent of the 
level of output but decreasing in the amount of investment each firm does in R&D. 
Where, marginal costs are the decreasing function of R&D (N). Profits of each firm are 
revenue, less production and transport costs, and also less R&D expense. By using the 
open loop concept, Krugman made the parallel between R&D and static economies very 
transparent. In the model the investment in R&D has an effect on profits that is 
proportional to expected sales. This is a form of increasing returns and is the key to the 
model. Firstly the levels of R&D expenditure were chosen and then implied MC is used 
to compute outputs. This process was repeated till convergence.  The figure below show 
the determination of N given N*. The higher the N, the lower be the marginal production 
cost, and thus higher will be the output; the curve QQ captures this relationship. On the 
other hand, the larger the output the greater the marginal profitability of R&D, so N is 
increasing in output along MM. QQ is assumed to be steeper than MM. If the foreign firm 
were to increase its own R&D, the effect would be to lower its marginal cost and reduce 
domestic output for any given N. The QQ will shift left and N falls. The result is that N is 
decreasing in N* and vice versa; in figure below the stable or own effects dominating 
case is shown.  
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U=U(N), U*=U*(N*) 
 
 
                    N 
  
 
                                   M 
                                                       Q 
 
                                                                ∑ Xi  
 
 
The effect of reserving some market for the domestic firm is obvious. At given N and N* 
domestic output rises and foreign output falls. The QQ curve shifts out, its foreign 
counter part shifts in. Thus N(N*) shifts right, N*(N) shifts down; N rises, N* falls. 
Reduced marginal production costs for the home firm and higher marginal production 
cost for the foreign firm mean increased domestic sales in all markets. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                    N*                                                               N*(N) 
 
                                                                                               N(N*)                            
                                                                                        N 
 
 17 
The point here is that protection, by increasing the home firm’s sales and reducing those 
of its foreign competitors, increase the incentive of domestic R&D at foreign expense. 
This in turn translates into a shift in relative production costs, which leads to increased 
domestic sales even in un protective markets. Even though there are no static scale 
economies, the result is same as in previous model. Here, if domestic firm is from the 
North and foreign firm is from the South, TRIPS would reduce the production of similar 
manufacturing goods in the South.  
 
CASE 3: Learning Curve: 
 
In this version there are neither static economies of scale nor explicit investment in R&D; 
instead, the increasing returns take a dynamic form: higher output reduces the costs of 
production later. These learning by doing economies turn out to yield results very similar 
to those in the other models. Again there are two firms, home and foreign. They compete 
in a number of markets, but now they compete over time as well as space. In market the 
revenues of the two firms are 
 
nwhereixxRR
xxRR
iiii
iiii
,....1),,*(*
*),(
==
=
  
where xi and xi* now represent rates of delivery per unit time.On the cost side firm faces 
constant transport costs ti, ti* to each market. At a point in time production costs are 
characterized by constant marginal costs *,µµ .Each firm’s terminal marginal cost will be 
decreasing in other’s: equilibrium is illustrated in the figure, where once again it is 
assumed that own effects predominate cross effects. The effect of protection is now 
exactly parallel to its effect in the case of static scale economies. Excluding the foreign 
firm from some market increases the cumulative output of the domestic firm and reduces 
the cumulative output of the foreign firm for the given Ut,Ut*. The result is that Ut(Ut*) 
shifts left, Ut*(Ut) shift up; Ut falls, Ut* rises. This in turn means that xi rises and xi* 
falls in all markets, whether they were directly protected or not. Once again if the 
 18 
domestic firm is Northern and Foreign firm is Southern, TRIPs is clearly a protection 
against South in a way that South will not proceed with the process of learning by doing. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         Ut* 
 
 
                                                                                                         Ut(Ut*)      Ut*(Ut) 
                                                                                     Ut 
 
It is the logic of monopoly to charge as high a price as the market can bear, with the 
purpose of maximizing profits. Price increases shall be a regular feature, and not an 
accident, with the introduction and /or strengthening of patent protection in developing 
countries. An outstanding example is the case of Pharmaceuticals. There is a solid set of 
studies, undertaken in developed and developing countries, and in institutions such as 
World bank and the International Monetary Fund (see Box 1, Appendix 1) that 
consistently indicate that developing countries are going to suffer from substantial price 
increases and other costs. 
 
Many authors have investigated the likely impact of the strengthening or introduction of 
IPRs in developing countries. Most of the studies are, however, limited to the patent field. 
They include Chin and Grossman (1988), Primo Braga (1989, 1992, 1995), Primo Braga 
and Fink(1995), Deardoff (1992), and Diwan and Rodrik(1991), among others. It is 
difficult to draw general conclusions from these studies, given their different scope, 
assumptions and methodologies. Chin and Grossman (1988), for instance, examined the 
“welfare economics of patent protection” in a trading environment. They concluded that 
IPRs do enhance global efficiency at least for substantial innovations, but the South 
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would incur losses which the North should be willing and able to compensate. Deardoff 
(1992) explored the welfare effects of extending patent protection and found that, since at 
least the poorest countries could not be expected to gain from it, they should be exempted 
from any new agreement that is made to extend patent protection under GATT.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
As part of the concluding remarks a further data analysis on the total exports (in US 
dollars) of the world from 1990 to 1997 is being undertaken by dividing it into two 
categories; North and South. North is a combination of 31 developed countries where as 
South comprises of 115 developing countries (see figure 2, APPENDIX 1). The first 
graph obtained by the analysis show that for every given year there is a sharp increase in 
the total exports of the North. Where as South also witness some increase in the exports 
but it is negligible. The second graph shows the gap between the total exports of North 
and South for every given year. Once again, it is evident from the graph that the gap is 
increasing over the years, especially after 1994 there is comparatively a sharp rise in the 
export gap of the two entities. The last graph tells us the growth rates of exports of North 
and South for the sample period. If we look at the period after 1994 in the graph, a very 
interesting observation could be made; the growth rate of North’s exports is following an 
increasing trend, whereas that of South is falling down. The irony is that this is more or 
less the period considered to be the best in the history of international trade by the 
proponents of free trade. Such trends indicate that current international trade scenario is 
biased against the South. There must be some truth to the skeptics of globalization that 
TRIPS is working for the interests of a small group of developed nations (31), where as 
the majority of the world (115), which unfortunately lies in the South, are, being ignored 
and their interests are being hampered   
 
Overall, the adoption of TRIPs agreement represented a major victory for industrialized 
countries and for their most active industrial lobbies. It mirrors the standards of IPRs 
protection that are suitable for industrialized countries at their current level of 
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development. Under such circumstances, the least North could do is to provide South 
with the opportunity or margin to maneuver left by the TRIPs agreement so that they can 
avoid or reduce eventual negative effects. Developing countries need the time, expertise 
and the political determination to implement the Agreement in conformity with their own 
conditions and needs.  
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Appendix 1: 
 
Box 12: 
                        Impact of patents on prices of medicines 
 
1. The minimum welfare loss to a sample of developing countries ( Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Mexico, Korea and Taiwan) would amount to a minimum of US$3.5 billion and a maximum of 
US$10.8 billion, while the income gains by foreign patent owners would be between US$2.1 
billion and US$14.4 billion. 
 
2. A “national health disaster” has been anticipated by the Indian Drug Manufacturer’s 
Association as a result of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in the country, where only 
30% of the population can afford modern medicines inspire of the fact that drugs policies in 
India are one of the lowest in the world. Comparisons of the prices of drugs between India and 
countries where patent protection exists indicate that in some cases they are up to 41 times 
costlier in countries with patent protection (National Working Group on Patent Laws, 1993). 
 
3. Similarly, drug prices in Malaysia, where patent protection existed, were from 20% to 760% 
higher than in India, which reflected a profit maximizing behavior based on “what the market can 
bear. Welfare and price effects are also found to be negative for a number of Asian countries. 
Price increases estimated for patented drugs ranges from 5% to 67%. Annual welfare losses for 
India(the biggest market) ranged between US$162 million and US$ 1,261 million, and annual 
profit transfer to foreign firms between US$101 million and US$839 million(Subramanian, 
1995a and 1995b). 
 
4. Price increases of drugs resulting from the introduction of product patents in Egypt were 
estimated at five to six folds as compared to non patented products.  
 
5. Some estimates also suggest that the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in 
Argentina would imply an annual additional expenditure of US$194 million with a reduction of 
45.5% in the consumption of medicines, as a result of a price increase of around 270%. The 
increase in remittances of foreign firms abroad would reach US$367million. Fiscal expenditures 
would have to increase by around US$200 million annually in order not to affect the current 
public health level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
2 The information is taken from Carlos (2000) 
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